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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is no case law discussing rule 37(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This court should therefore look to precedent concerning rule 37(b)(2) for guidance, as 
that subsection is referenced in rule 37(g) and that body of law outlines the Utah courts' 
interpretation of how the trial court should exercise its discretion in imposing sanctions 
for discovery violations, including the "extreme sanction of default and dismissal." 
Moreover, under Utah case law concerning rule 37(b)(2), sanctions are warranted when 
the party's conduct is done in bad faith or when it is part of a consistent pattern of 
dilatory conduct. Here, there is not sufficient evidence to support the requirement that 
DayNight's destruction of Mr. Rowe's laptop was done in bad faith or as part of a 
consistent pattern of dilatory conduct disregarding court orders. 
Even if this court did find that the rule 37(b)(2) requirements do not apply to rule 
37(g), or were met in this case, this court should still find that the district court abused its 
discretion in awarding default judgment to Mobilight because it erroneously concluded 
that the evidence contained on the laptop was essential to proving Mobilight's claims. 
But to prove its claim under the UUTSA, Mobilight must show that DayNight actually 
used the information contained on the laptop. There is substantial, more probative 
evidence besides the information on the laptop to prove or disprove DayNight's actual 
use of that information, including, among other factors, the design and construction of 
DayNight's light tower, whether DayNight contacted any of Mobilight's customers, and 
whether DayNight is using the same suppliers and the same parts. Instead, the trial court 
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simply assumed the information on the destroyed laptop was "used," assumed it was 
critical, and thereby prohibited the defendants from using their general skill and 
knowledge to develop their own business. 
Finally, the district court abused its discretion in awarding the extremely harsh 
sanction of default judgment because there are alternative sanctions that could punish 
DayNighf s behavior and still follow the court's policy allowing parties to have their day 
in court. DayNighf s lack of bad faith in destroying Mr. Rowe's laptop, combined with 
its due process rights to a trial on the merits, makes the district court's award of default 
judgment against DayNight extremely harsh, unjustified, and an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Case law interpreting Rule 37(b)(2) would prove useful in this case. 
Rule 37(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[n]othing in this 
rule limits the inherent power of the court to take any action authorized by [subdivision 
(b)(2) if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or fails to preserve a document, 
tangible item, electronic data or other evidence in violation of a duty." Mobilight argues 
that because rule 37(g) only references rule 37(b)(2) as a list of possible sanctions a trial 
court could impose for rule 37(g) violations, it does not necessarily mean that case law 
interpreting rule 37(b)(2) applies. However, providing guidance in deciding when to use 
the rule 37(b)(2) sanctions, and what sanction is appropriate, is precisely why case law 
has developed. Clearly, as indicated by the present controversy, case law interpreting 
rule 37(g)'s reference to "any action authorized by [subdivision (b)(2)" is useful. 
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There is no Utah case law interpreting rule 37(g) because subsection (g) is a recent 
addition to rule 37. Thus, we can and should look for guidance in Utah courts' previous 
opinions concerning rule 37(b)(2); and Utah courts have determined that under rule 
37(b)(2), an imposition of sanctions is only authorized when there is evidence of a party's 
"willfulness, bad faith, fault or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process." 
Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127, f 16, 981 P.2d 407. The imposition of such a rule 
would not lead to an absurd conclusion as Mobilight suggests, but would be more 
consistent with Utah courts' interpretation of rule 37 concerning when discovery 
sanctions are appropriate. 
II. The district court made an erroneous conclusion of law in determining 
that evidence from Mr. Rowe's laptop is central to proving Mobilight's 
claims. 
Under Utah law, a district court abuses its discretion in imposing sanctions if (1) 
the district court failed to find an evidentiary basis for its ruling or (2) the district court 
relied on "an erroneous conclusion of law." Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement Inc., 
2008 UT 82, Tf23, 199 P. 3d 957. In this case, under the second analysis, it is clear that 
the district court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions against DayNight. The 
district court made an erroneous conclusion of law when it determined that the evidence 
from the laptop was central to proving Mobilight's case. Mobilight asserts that all of its 
claims against DayNight center on the electronic data that was contained on Mr. Rowe's 
laptop. This is simply not the case. 
3 
In its first amended counterclaim and third-party complaint, Mobilight asserts that 
DayNight violated the Utah Uniform Trade Secret Act ("UUTSA"). See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 13-24-1 et seq. (2010). An essential step in proving a claim under the Utah Uniform 
Trade Secret Act ("UUTSA"), which might pre-empt many of Mobilight's other causes 
of action, is whether the confidential information was actually used. See Water & Energy 
Systems Tech., Inc. v. Keil 1999 UT 16, ^ |9, 974 P.2d 821 (Utah 1999). So even if Mr. 
Rowe's laptop did contain all of the information that Mobilight claims it contains, 
Mobilight would still have to prove that DayNight actually used that information. 
Mobilight points to no case law stating that simply possessing confidential information is 
sufficient to prove a violation of the UUTSA because no such case law exists. 
There is other sufficient, more probative evidence that could be used to prove 
whether DayNight actually used the information contained on Mr. Rowe's laptop, or any 
of Mobilight's purported "trade secrets." For instance, Mobilight claims that DayNight 
had access to its customer list, but merely possessing that information is not sufficient. A 
party must prove use to establish a violation of the UUTSA. To discover whether 
DayNight used this information, Mobilight is free to contact its customers and subpoena 
testimony regarding whether DayNight ever solicited business from these customers. 
Furthermore, Mobilight claims the laptop contained design information for its light 
towers. But even assuming that the laptop did actually contain that information, the real 
question is whether DayNight used that design information to design its own light tower. 
To prove that DayNight did not use Mobilight's design information, DayNight had an 
expert testify that the light tower it was building was radically different from the light 
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tower that Mobilight had built. To counter this, Mobilight is also free to call its own 
expert and perform its own analysis on the two light towers. Finally, Mobilight claims 
that DayNight had access to its pricing information on Mr. Rowe's laptop. Even 
assuming that the laptop contained Mobilight's pricing information, the important 
question is whether DayNight used that pricing information. Testimony from the 
preliminary hearing indicates that DayNight was not planning to compete with Mobilight 
in the same pricing arena. Instead, DayNight had plans to build a more expensive light 
tower. By looking at DayNight's own pricing information, the jury would have evidence 
concerning DayNight's any alleged actual use of Mobilight's pricing information. There 
is ample evidence besides the laptop that could be used to prove or disprove DayNight's 
actual use of Mobilight's confidential information. 
Mobilight asserts that looking at how the parties actually used the confidential 
information would simply allow a person to take confidential information and make 
minor changes to it to avoid liability. However, this is not at all the result that 
DayNight's position would expound. First, DayNight is simply arguing that the trade 
secret law requiring actual use of the data be enforced. The only thing that the 
information on the laptop could prove is only that DayNight possessed Mobilight's 
confidential information. 
Mobilight further claims that because Mr. Rowe and Mr. LaMarr did not have any 
experience in the light tower industry, "it is reasonable to assume that they needed and 
would have used Mobilight's confidential information to gain a foothold in the industry." 
(Brief of Appellees at 27). However, this assertion calls for a factual determination that 
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should be left for a jury, and is inconsistent with an employee's right to use his or her 
general skill and knowledge upon leaving a company's employment. Moreover, simply 
gaining a foothold in the industry does not prove use of Mobilight's confidential 
information. Prior work experience and research could do the same thing. 
Finally, Mobilight also points to specific allegations in its complaint alleging that 
DayNight misappropriated Mobilight's confidential information electronically. 
However, those allegations are all supporting Mobilight's actual claim of 
misappropriation of trade secrets. These allegations themselves are not sufficient, alone, 
to support the UTTSA violation allegation. Instead, the allegations must be read as a 
whole with the allegations that DayNight actually used the information that Mobilight 
asserts was misappropriated. As DayNight has previously argued, it is the use of that 
electronic information that is necessary to this case. And, again as previously argued, 
DayNight's alleged use can be proved by other evidence. Simply possessing the 
information does not at all prove that DayNight used it or intended to use it. All 
DayNight asks is to get the chance to present its case and defenses to a jury, even if 
Mobilight gets all favorable inferences that DayNight possessed all of the electronic 
information Mobilight claims that DayNight possessed. 
III. The district court abused its discretion in imposing the extremely harsh 
sanction of default judgment and denying DayNight its day in court. 
Mobilight is correct in its assertion that the appellate court reviews the district 
court's imposition of a discovery sanction under an abuse of discretion standard and 
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affords the district court a "great deal of latitude." Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 
UT 52, p 5 , 215 P.3d 933. However, the district court's discretion is not without 
limitations, and must be more narrowly construed in cases where default judgment is 
entered as a discovery sanction. In Carmen v. Slaven, 546 P.2d 601 (Utah 1976), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the district court's discretion does not give the court 
"unrestrained power to act in an arbitrary manner.... The meaning of the term 
"discretion" itself imports that the action should be taken within reason and good 
conscience in the interest of protecting the rights of both parties and serving the ends of 
justice." Id. at 603. This is why the district court must recognize that "default judgment 
is an unusually harsh sanction that should be meted out with caution," Darrington v. 
Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), even though it has discretion in choosing 
which discovery sanction to impose. 
In Carmen, the court held that default judgment was a particularly harsh sanction 
because it denied a party the right to present its case at trial. The court emphasized that 
"[i]t has always been the policy of our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties 
to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy" Id. (emphasis added). Other 
courts have likewise recognized that default judgment is an extreme sanction. As the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stated: 
This Circuit has a well established policy favoring a trial on the merits over 
a default judgment. For that reason, a default judgment should be used 
only in extreme situations, or when other less drastic sanctions have proven 
unavailing. Although a district court has the default judgment readily 
available within its arsenal of sanctions, it is a weapon of last resort, 
appropriate only when a party willfully disregards the pending litigation. 
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See Yong-Qian Sun v. Board of Trustees, 473 F. 3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Montanile v. Botticelli, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 65140 (July 28, 2009) ("Courts uniformly have held that orders dismissing the 
action or granting judgment on default as sanctions for violating discovery orders are 
generally deemed appropriate only as a last resort, or when less drastic sanctions would 
not ensure compliance with a court's orders. A court should give adequate consideration 
to the effectiveness of lesser sanctions before imposing a sanction that ends a party's 
case." (Internal citations omitted.)). 
In this case, the district court similarly abused its discretion by granting default 
judgment to Mobilight. The harsh sanction of default judgment denies DayNight its due 
process rights to a trial on the merits and fails to serve the ends of justice. The jury 
should be allowed to view the different light tower designs and to hear testimony from 
fact witnesses and experts to determine whether any of Mobilight's confidential 
information was used in the development of the DayNight's light tower. The jury should 
hear testimony that there was virtually no overlap of suppliers used by DayNight and 
Mobilight, and that DayNight had not contacted any of Mobilight's customers. This 
evidence, even with an adverse inference against DayNight, would allow the jury 
sufficient evidence to determine whether the DayNight tower was a product of 
Defendants' "general knowledge or expertise," which the Supreme Court has stated can 
be properly used, see Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 95-96 (Utah 1992), 
or the use of Mobilight's trade secrets, once Mobilight has identified its purported trade 
secrets. 
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Mobilight argues that the trial court's imposition of default judgment was 
appropriate because Mobilight would suffer prejudice if the case were to proceed to trial 
without the evidence on Mr. Rowe's laptop. However, Mobilight cannot legitimately 
suggest that it would be prejudiced at trial, when DayNight concedes that Mobilight 
would be entitled to a favorable inference at trial concerning the contents of Mr. Rowe's 
laptop. See Killpatrick, 2008 UT 82, f 39. Mobilight claims that it would still be 
prejudiced because a jury would have to speculate what information was on the laptop; 
but that is not the case. A favorable inference would essentially require DayNight to 
concede that the laptop contained the information Mobilight claims it contained. Thus, 
Mobilight would just have to prove that DayNight actually used that information, which, 
as discussed above, it could do through a number of other forms of evidence. There is no 
real way that Mobilight would be severely prejudiced by the destruction of the laptop if 
this case were to go to trial. 
Moreover, Mobilight argues that the trial court was within its discretion to impose 
such a harsh sanction because DayNight acted in bad faith. However, although Mobilight 
is correct in asserting that DayNight acted intentionally in destroying Mr. Rowe's laptop, 
this does not prove that DayNight acted in bad faith. It is the lack of bad faith in that 
makes the extreme result of default judgment unduly harsh. Just because Mobilight does 
not believe DayNight's explanation for why it destroyed the laptop, it does not mean that 
DayNight's explanation is not real or justified. DayNight concedes that its behavior 
exemplified poor judgment and was even childish at points. However, their lack of 
sophistication and lapse in judgment should not be enough to prevent them from 
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defending the case against them on the merits, especially when there are other sanctions 
available to sufficiently punish DayNight for its behavior. 
Default judgment is an extremely harsh sanction that deprives DayNight of its due 
process rights. The district court's imposition of the most severe sanction against 
Mobilight was an abuse of discretion because Mobilight is not prejudiced by the lack of 
evidence from the laptop, DayNight did not act in bad faith, and other sanctions 
combined with the inferences given in favor of Mobilight at trial, would sufficiently 
punish DayNight. 
IV. There is not sufficient evidence to support a finding of bad faith or 
dilatory conduct disregarding court orders. 
As set forth above, in order to establish that the district court abused its discretion 
in awarding sanctions to Mobilight and entering default judgment against DayNight, this 
court reviews whether there was an "evidentiary basis for the [district] court's ruling" or 
whether the district court relied on "an erroneous conclusion of law." Kilpatrick, 2008 
UT 82, <p3. Regarding the first analysis of whether the district court had a sufficient 
evidentiary basis for its ruling, Mobilight argues that there is ample evidence to support 
the court's finding that DayNight intentionally destroyed Mr. Rowe's laptop. DayNight 
does not argue that there is no evidence that DayNight intentionally destroyed the laptop; 
in fact, DayNight concedes that the evidence supports this fact. However, the evidence 
fails to show DayNight's intention was in bad faith, or that DayNight's actions were part 
of a consistent pattern or dilatory tactics to avoid court orders. 
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DayNight offered a legitimate explanation for its behavior—it simply wanted to 
stop Mobilight from harassing DayNight and trespassing onto DayNight5s property. 
DayNight made a poor judgment in its attempt to do this. However, that poor judgment 
does not indicate that the destruction of Mr. Rowe's laptop was in bad faith. Mobilight 
tends to focus on the language used in the video recording of Mr. LaMarr and Mr. Rowe 
destroying the laptop: "We are about to destroy any final, potential harmful evidence." 
(R. 662). However, it fails to take this statement into context. Mr. LaMarr's very next 
statement illustrates DayNight's motives for destroying the laptop: "[W]e have not used 
Cory's laptop. We have not in any way used that information that he has gleaned from 
Mobilight. We think it best to destroy it." (R. 492). Mr. LaMarr further stated that "I do 
testify that we have not in any way copied any of the data that comes from Mobilight's 
register of potential or alleged intellectual property. We have no desire in any way shape 
or form to copy their product or service, to mimic in any way their business practices, and 
therefore this is why we want to do this. To end this problem once and for all." (R. 492-
94). Although DayNight's actions were not the best way of addressing the problems 
between DayNight and Mobilight, its intentions were clearly to simply stop Mobilight's 
harassment and show Mobilight that it was not using the information contained on the 
laptop.1 
Mobilight argues that DayNight cannot legitimately claim to have destroyed the laptop 
to show Mobilight that DayNight wasn't using it because files can be copied easily. 
However, this undermines Mobilight's own argument that the laptop is the only evidence 
it could use to prove its case. If DayNight had made copies of the information to use, 
then the evidence would conceivably exist elsewhere and would be available to Mobilight 
through discovery. 
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Thus, the district court's lack of an evidentiary basis centers more on its failure to 
find DayNight's bad faith or persistent dilatory tactics. Moreover, a finding of an 
evidentiary basis for the district court's award of sanctions is simply one of the two 
analyses this court uses to evaluate whether the district court abused its discretion. The 
more important analysis in this case is the second determination of whether the district 
court made an erroneous conclusion of law, which the district court did in this case, as 
argued above. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the availability of other evidence to prove Mobilight's claims, the denial of 
DayNight's due process rights by the entry of the extremely harsh sanction of default 
judgment, and the reasonable, if mistaken, belief under which DayNight destroyed the 
laptop, the district court's sanction awarding default judgment and attorney fees against 
DayNight should be reversed. 
DATED this 20th day of October, 2010. 
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